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POLICY MAKING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT:
SOME THOUGHTS ON PROCESSES
AND RESEARCH ISSUES
TIMOTHY O'RIORDAN*
Policy making has been defined as "the process of transformation
which turns political inputs into political outputs."' It is the

mechanism through which society's collective demands are monitored by the political system for conversion into action. As envisioned here, the role of policy making is not so much the resolution
of particular decisions as it is the creation of a "decision environment"-a set of rules, roles and procedures which guide behavior and

shape expectations-in which a variety of connected or related decisions can be made. This decision environment is probably a crucial
concept but its definition and comprehension remain elusive.
Students of decision making2 are increasingly unhappy about visualizing decisions as discrete, observable steps in some sort of rational,
incremental process. It appears more realistic to think of decisionmaking as a series of gradually narrowing choices in which participants at any one step, either knowingly or unwittingly, restrict the
options available at the next.3
One purpose of this paper is to look at the factors which mould
this decision environment, in an attempt to analyze its influence in
the area of environmental management. The result of this examination indicates that certain functions of the decision environment can
be put to good use when searching for improved mechanisms for
policy making. The second part of this paper investigates areas of
interest for future research and suggests certain modifications of
*Reader in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia,
Norwich, England.
Some of the ideas advanced here were spawned in conversations with members of Westwater Research Center, University of B.C. The author is particularly grateful to Irving Fox
and Ken Peterson.
1. E. Schoettle, The State ofthe Art in Policy Studies in The Study of Policy Formation
149 (R. Bauer & J. K. Gergen eds., 1964).
2. The general arguments are reviewed in F. Castles, D. Murray & D. Potter, Decisions,
Organizations and Society 285-292 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Castles], but a detailed
discussion can be found in F. Brown, The Administrative Process in Britain:Decisions in
Decisions, Organizations and Society 86-102 (1971).
3. To quote Castles, supra note 2, at 291. For those who attempt to discover the bias of
a decision making system by looking at the decision makers themselves, a real problem is
raised by looking at the exact point at which a decision is reached. The procedures of
decision making may be such as to create a filtration process in which the identification of
the time and place of the decisional choice becomes virtually impossible.
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existing policy making structures that might be worthy of careful
experimentation.
THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT
A decision environment can be established only under certain
conditions. One is that society is willing to give its support to a
polity which is thereby granted the authority to allocate power and
determine social values. Another condition is that of legitimization,
for, in order to exert power and execute decisions, the political
system must regularly solicit support and reaffirmation of the validity of its measures. Elections, referenda, public hearings, commissions of inquiry, the employment of independent consultants, and
requests for "public response" are all examples of legitimizing
mechanisms. 4 Furthermore, those who enact policy require legitimizing tools, which have come to attain an almost mystical aura. Planners display plans, public health officials pronounce safe minimum
standards, engineers design computerized simulation models with
built-in conservative safeguards, economists employ cost benefit
analyses and administrators delight in planning, programming and
budgeting systems.
Implied by these two conditions is a third-that of political consensus. Many investigators have stressed the notion of consensus, for
it is vital for the smooth functioning of complex human organizations. Dahl' visualizes consensus as "a recurring process of interaction" among members of the political stratum and the non-political
population, an interaction based upon a shared acceptance of roles
and rules of procedure. While objectives may not be widely agreed
upon, mechanisms through which objectives can be attained are
generally accepted by all actors, including the general public. In
other words, in order for the policy making process to function
effectively, all those who participate in it must agree to certain basic
rules and accept a structure of role specialization. This is necessary to
sanction leadership and to permit policy implementation. Organizations of all kinds flourish because their members have faith that
they work; consequently, an adaptive, responsive, and reasonably
well functioning political process tends to be stable and enduring.
Political consensus can be distinguished on three levels in policy
making-between the electorate and their political representatives,
between interest group members (including the political caucus) and
4. An excellent analysis of the symbolism of political legitimizing tactics can be found in
M. Edelman, The Symbolic Use of Power (1964).
5. R. Dahl, Who Governs 315-24 (1961).
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their delegated leaders, and between agency personnel and their
executive heads. At each of these levels we shall see how the existence of consensus serves to sanction power, establish rules, develop
specialized roles and, generally, to permit a complex socio-political
process to function. We shall also discover just how little monitoring
need take place to enable leaders to act and their constiuents to
support.
The Electorateand Their PoliticalRepresentatives
Almond and Verba 6 emphasize that in stable democracies the
maintenance of elite power is perpetuated by a sense of trust on the
part of the public which believes that since the body politic is part of
the same political community, the self-interest of elites will be the
same as the collective social interest. However, when it comes to
social questions (such as environmental issues) there is little evidence
that this is true. To begin with, it seems that many people do not
hold well formed opinions in social matters,7 implying that they are
not in a position or simply not willing to inform themselves of social
problems (such as environmental degradation) which do not have a
direct bearing on their everyday lives, or that they are content to
leave the resolution of these questions to their political leaders. If the
latter speculation is correct (and certainly this is often assumed) then
their faith may not be well founded. A recent Gallup poll' found
that 55% of Americans displayed profound cynicism and alienation
toward their political leadership, while both Miller and Stokes9 and
Luttberg1 ° have demonstrated the gulf that lies between the
6. G. Almond & S. Verba, The Civic Culture (1963).
7. P. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics in Ideology and Discontent
(D. Apter ed. 1964), shows that while a majority of the public (60-70%) seemed to have
some knowledge of a number of social issues, few (about 20%) were able to express an
informed opinion, and fewer still (about 5%) were able to comment on the precise nature of
government policy and performance respecting specific questions.
8. The special Gallup poll was commissioned by the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and published in their report entitled Confidence and Concern.
Citizens View American Government (1973). The poll found that while only 35% of the
interviewed sample felt that the quality of life had improved, and 45% felt it had deteriorated (5% had no opinion and 5% did not respond), 65-70% of elected officials believed that
the quality of life had improved. Generally, the poll found that the discrepancy between the
views of the electorate and political figures became more marked at the state and local
levels, and that elected officials generally were far more sanguine about governmental performance than were the sampled citizens. In the absence of any direct monitoring mechanism and in view of the demonstrable lack of articulation of public concern over matters of
collective interest this discrepancy might not seem surprising. But it is hardly conducive to
wise political action.
9. Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress 57 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 45
(1963).
10. Luttberg, The Structure of Public Beliefs on State Policies: a Comparison with Local
and National Findings, 37 Pub. Opinion Q. 104 (1971).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 16

opinions of the electorate, as imagined by their political representatives, and opinions as surveyed through interviews.
The evidence is revealing but not very illuminating. It appears that
policy making at the political level takes place with only weakly
established links between the public and their elected representatives. For a variety of reasons-because they don't really
care, because they feel there are some individuals supporting
their case, because they have no faith in the political process, and
possibly because they imagine that they cannot change political events
even if they really put their mind to it-the majority of people are willing to let matters of public importance be handled by a relatively
small number of active participants, who periodically must seek
support to maintain their favored position. Almond and Verbal I
conclude that this apparently widespread passivity is necessary to
permit the political elites to act authoritatively, but that elite
authority is always tempered by the threat of mobilized public
action. Thus, consensus is maintained through the balance between
passivity and potential participatory action.
This kind of consensus arrangement can have interesting implications for environmental quality issues, the solutions to which may
directly affect special interests but in determining which there is
clearly mobilized public support. Crenson' 2 developed Bachrach and
Baratz's' 3 notion of non-decision making in an analysis of why air
pollution control efforts were delayed in two communities near
Chicago. Crenson found that powerful coalitions actually impeded
efforts to upgrade air quality simply by preventing the air pollution
problem from reaching the political agenda. Even though there was a
recognizable public interest over the matter of air pollution, it was so
weakly advocated that the "public regarding ethos" of the political
leaders was not actuated sufficiently to overcome their "private
regarding ethos." Where problems pose solutions which challenge the
dominant values and rules of political consensus, substantial power
may be directed simply at keeping this challenge out of the political
arena. Non-decisions may thus be the result of a politically enforced
neglect which may be sanctioned over a considerable period of time.
The deliberate suppression of emission control devices by the big
11. Almond & Verba, supra note 6, at 34647.
12. M. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution (1972). Crenson derived much of his
theme from a statement by Schnattschneider. All forms of political organization have a bias
in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because
organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others
are organized out! (emphasis in original). See E. Schnattschneider, The Semisovereign
Peoples (1960).
13. Bachrach & Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 947 (1962).
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automobile makers in the fifties and the unwillingness of the A.E.C.
to make public the controversy over reactor design safeguards in the
early seventies1 4 are just two examples of non-decision making with
respect to environmental matters where a clear public interest was
involved. At this level of policy making, then, one influence of the
decision environment may be to determine just what is included or
excluded from political agendas. Despite the demonstrable weaknesses in the linkage between the electorate and their political
representatives, political consensus maintains the necessary support,
legitimization, and authority to permit this to happen. In this connection the legally sanctioned entry of well-informed and wellmobilized public interest groups is tremendously important, but how
well these groups can penetrate the decision environment that leads
to non-decision making is difficult to determine, and clearly will vary
from one situation to another.
Specialized Interestsand Their Leadership
Crenson's analysis indicates that specialized interest groups can
mobilize biases to impede political discussion of certain issues and to
maintain an existing decision environment. Pressure groups are
embedded in the political fabric and seek to influence policy in the
direction of their own interests. In addition they often act as useful
sources of information for the policy maker and, albeit very imperfectly, as indicators of the public temper.
But interest groups are mobilized by their own kind of consensus
which promotes their common purpose, generates support for their
strategies and establishes clearly defined roles.' 5 One outcome of
this is that the leadership of such groups can enter the policy making
arena confident of the support of their membership. In the case of
large and well organized groups (trade unions, chambers of commerce, trade associations, professional associations, etc.) leaders
enjoy considerable power but are regularly subjected to scrutiny by
their membership. So, while their influence is considerable, pressure
group leaders must constantly monitor the views of their supporters.
Such groups are powerful partly because they are mobilized to
achieve the simple objective of protecting their collective self interest, partly because they are well anchored within the political
14. The whole story of the AEC controversy can be seen in five articles by Gillette,
Nuclear Reactor Safety, 176 Science 492; 177 Science 867, 970, 1080; and 178 Science
482. For a wider perspective see R. Lewis, The Nuclear Power Rebellion (1972).
15. A useful conceptual analysis of the role and function of interest groups can be found
in G. Wooton, Interest Groups (1970).
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system, and partly because the policy makers whose opinions they
wish to influence are easily targeted.
But those powerful groups are rarely influential in determining the
collective public interest. 1 6 Problems afflicting society as a whole
never become the prerogative of any particular group, thus pressure
group behavior fails in the discovery and expression of the common
good. Indeed, as was noted above, the activities of such groups may
actually impede the identification of environmental problems and
certainly inhibit any survey of initial solutions.
The implication of the discussion so far is that policy making is
conducted among a relatively few influential people, who are not
required to know specifically the nature of their client's interests,
but whose power is sanctioned by periodic scrutiny and well established procedures to legitimize their authority. But within this broad
consensus the political culture is divided by a number of competing
demands for different favorable outcomes, simply because elites and
their supporters do not share similar objectives. The result is that
policy making becomes dominated by a process of negotiation, bargaining, concession trading, and compromise hinted at by Schoettle
in her definition and more explicitly formulated by a number of
writers including Wengert' ' and Dror."8 Bargaining behavior is
expedited if the representatives meet face-to-face knowing that they
enjoy the trust and support of their constituents and are mutually
perceived as enjoying that support. Bargaining is a process requiring
specialized talents so it should be stressed that interest group leaders
exert influence in relatively well defined areas of policy.
This general observation is of particular significance in environmental policy making where highly specialized technical information
may be concentrated in the hands of interests whose activities are the
subject of regulation by environmental protection agencies. For
example, most of the research technology and expertise relating to
the control of automobile emissions and the development of alternative forms of motive power lies in the hands of the manufacturers
themselves. This makes it extremely difficult for regulatory agencies
to question their evidence or to produce contrary, but equally
expert, testimony. As a result, regulatory agencies are sometimes
forced to invoke sanctions other than those of countervailing expert
evidence, such as police powers or the withholding of tax concessions
16. This point is well developed by Olson, who argues that any public purpose served by
interest groups is largely a by product of their primary concern-the protection of their own
self interest. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 5-16, 132-37 (1965).
17. N. Wengert, Natural Resources and the Political Struggle (1955).
18. Y. Dror, Public Policymaking Re-examined (1968).
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or public funds, and at times they may appeal to the general public
for the necessary support so that they can bargain with political
strength, if not always with technical expertise. Thus pollution control becomes a political-technical bargaining process amongst key
individuals.' 9
We can categorize the role of key individuals and groups in policy
making along the dimensions of resources and power. Resources refer
to the level of information, to expertise, and to the organizational
ability to transmit this information effectively. Power is a function
of the use of resources to influence decisions in desired directions.
The two are closely related but the latter has a more political connotation, since it relates to perceived bargaining strength and to
future bargaining behavior.
Many environmental action groups, however, do not enjoy the
same internal cohesion as the well established lobbies because their
members are seldom bound by lasting ties and their leaders may be
inexperienced in the art of political bargaining. One exception to this
is the issue-oriented action group organized to protect a well defined
collective self-interest, such as a community group blocking a high
rise development in a highway proposal, or a residents' organization
fighting the extension of an airport runway. In such instances group
cohesion is strong, the strategies of group leaders are demonstrably
supported, and an effective consensus is mobilized. But in the case of
many ideologically-oriented environmentalist groups such solidarity
is lacking.
Nevertheless, many people feel that some form of citizen initiated
protest through active groups is a necessary means to achieve environmental goals. 2 o For environmental action groups to succeed, it
seems that they will have to adopt the organizational structure, command of information, and leadership responsiveness of the well
established lobbies. In addition they will probably have to choose
issues where there is a clearly defined community of interest or
where they can demonstrate that they can obtain strong membership
and public support. These policies appear to be adopted by the major
U.S. environmental action groups, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Friends of the Earth. Thus, in a curious way,
19. This point is part of the findings of Crenson, supra note 13, but it is more explicitly
developed by M. Holden, Pollution Control as a Bargaining Process (1966) and by Chevalier
& Cartwright, Towards An Action Framework for the Control of Pollution in National
Conference on Pollution and Our Environment (1966).
20. Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Affairs, supra note 8, at 94. In the
Gallup Poll cited earlier, 75% of the sampled population were members of one kind of social
group or another (though only 10% could be defined as active), but 49% felt that citizens
groups were becoming increasingly effective in policy making.
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pressure groups tend to resemble the very organizations they are
designed to fight.
Just as there is demonstrable weakness in the monitoring connection between the electorate and their political leaders, particularly
with regard to questions involving social choice, so there appears to
be a similar rupture in the linkage between group membership and
their leaders for the large majority of small scale, ideologically
motivated citizen action groups. This has implications in the decision
environment because policy makers view the effectiveness of such
groups in terms of the legitimacy of the information they produce
and the values they hold.
Consensus Within Executive Agencies
A third area of consensus is found within policy forming and
executing agencies. For these institutions to function effectively it is
necessary that their members agree to the executive mandates of the
organization, to its operating rules, and to well-defined and mutually
accepted roles. These commonly held orientations help to insulate
agency officials from "non-agency" viewpoints and encourage them
to seek support for their actions through the operating ethos of the
agency involved. 2 1 Under these cirumstances agencies seek the views
of internal or external experts who, in part, play a role of "uncertainty absorbers" by filtering complicated and possibly conflicting
evidence into a comprehensive format.
As information passes upwards through the agency hierarchy, it
tends to become more simple, more structured and more certain. This
is most noticeable in situations where the agency is not cohesive,
with senior officials regarded as holding different views from the
junior staff and where the need to condense complex information is
very great. 22 Hence it is possible for an organization to become
committed to policies that may have originated from marginal individuals armed with biased interpretations of selected evidence.
Nevertheless, such a situation can occur precisely because policy
formulating organizations operate on the basis of shared values and
group cohesiveness, factors which play a vital role in establishing a
21. A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 226-28 (1967) has shown that the need for internal
consensus maintenance is particularly strong where agency operations are complex, controversial or in competition with other agency directives. F. Brown, supra note 2, stresses the
fact that where decisions involve complexity and ambiguity-factors that inevitably threaten
the authority of an agency-the desire for legitimized facts is particularly strong.
22. This point is stressed in Downs, supra note 22, at 116-18, and is illustrated by Sax,

who reported how President Nixon was given a highly biased summary of all the arguments
in favor of the SST, with only a few contrary arguments, before making his decision to

continue with the controversial project. See J. Sax, Defending the Environment 84 (1970).
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framework for communication, legitimizing activity, and providing a
suitable rationale for pursuing any chosen course of action. One
effect of this is that intra-agency criticism tends to be stifled: the
maverick either conforms, voluntarily seeks resignation, or is
ousted. 2 ' The outcome of all this is that information flows within
bureaucracies and tends to be carefully monitored to reinforce consensus.
Thus the decision environment in the bureaucracy is composed, in
part of forces which seek to maintain organizational consensus, to
narrow agency perspectives, and to simplify information flows.
Related to this are pressures which encourage agency personnel to
follow routine procedures, and to fall back on variants of familiar
answers even when faced with somewhat novel situations. The
resource management literature is replete with examples of specialmission agencies who adopt narrow terms of reference and seek only
well tested solutions.2 Given the powerful consensus-maintaining
forces mentioned above, it is perfectly comprehensible why routine
procedures are followed, at least initially, and also why agency
reform does not provide a satisfactory answer. Unless the reform
explicitly incorporates a non-routine questioning and analyzing function, consensus-maintaining forces will tend to restrict the options
under review.
The Policy Making Process
Policy making is basically a political process in the sense that it is
concerned with legitimizing social action via the trading of preferences for certain kinds of desired outcomes. It is a process that relies
upon a substantial degree of implied consensus among participants
because, for any given set of decisions, relatively few actors are
involved. It is a process of bargaining and compromise based upon
some form of concession trading which, in turn, is propelled by
tensions that bridge conflict and conformity. Conflict produces stress
which must be resolved through the search for information, the
articulation of preferences, and the trading of gains and losses; conformity legitimizes this behavior, directs motivations and entrenches
prejudices.
Thus policy making is a behavioral process which is influenced by
the values, aspirations, motivations and beliefs of key actors and by
23. This point is well illustrated by Nader. See Nader, The Scientist and His Indentured
ProfessionalSocieties, 56 Bull. Atomic Sci. 43.
24. See, e.g., NAS-NRC Committee on Water, Alternatives in Water Management (1964)
and Water and Choice in the Colorado Basin (1966). See also A. Maass, Muddy Waters
(1951); C. Reich, Bureaucracy and the Forests (1966), and G. White, Strategies in American

Water Management (1969).
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the social setting in which they function. The forces in operation can
be divided into three interacting sets, namely: the personality characteristics of the key actors; the influences of the social, political
and/or institutional environment in which they work; and the nature
of the issues over which social choices must be made (Figure 1).21 It
should be emphasized that these sets of forces not only interact but
shift over time. It will be seen that all of this poses almost intractible
problems for the analyst, for key actors are often difficult to identify; they vary from issue to issue, their values and belief systems will
undoubtedly change, and the setting in which they enact their functions will present varying influences from time to time, setting to
setting and issue to issue. With this in mind it is easy to see the
challenge facing potential researchers in this field.
Personality, opinion formulation and political behavior interact
ISSUE
VARIABLES

PERSONALITY
VARIABLES

a) amount of data available
a) orientations

b) complexity and indeterminacy of data

b) ability to handle complexity
c) ability to restore inconsistencies

c) time available for information generation
and dissemination
d) resources and power of groups affected

INSTITUTIONAL
VARIABLES
a) degree of striving for consensus order roles,
rules and procedures
b) budgets, manpower and capability for
information generation
c) umbrage between leaders and membership
d) facility for routine/non-routine response

FIGURE 1
25. This diagram and discussion is helped by two sources. One is White, The Formation
and Role of Public Attitudes in Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy 105 (H.
Jarrett ed., 1966), and the other is Craik, An Ecological Perspective in Environmental
Decision Making, 1 Human Ecol. 69.
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through the meshing of three levels of orientation, namely: the
cognitive (relating to knowledge and beliefs); the affective (relating
to feelings of like or dislike); and the evaluative (relating to judgments of goals and modes of action) with regard to oneself, to other
actors, to the political setting and to the various roles and rules
encountered in the resolution of an issue. Thus it is clear that the
very perspective which defines the nature of the problem may be
colored by these orientations to such an extent that there may not
be any agreement among participants as to what constitutes the
problem, let alone how it can be remedied. 2 6 Where the issues are
enormously complicated and where information is either not available or indeterminate, as is often the case with environmental questions, problem identification can become a very contentious issue.
The orientations outlined above are influenced by personal experience, exposure to information and general knowledge. What seems to
be important here is the ability to handle complex information and
incorporate new evidence into a coherent and logical model, for this
permits familiarity in conceptualization and an openness to novel
solutions.2 7 Unfortunately, an ability to integrate complexity may
expose the actor to recognizable inconsistencies of viewpoint, or
discrepancies between belief and a chosen course of action, either
within himself or between himself and his colleagues. So, coupled
with an ability to cope with complexity and indeterminacy should be
a facility for recognizing and reconciling inconsistencies, attributes
that are not commonly found.
Where the issue under review takes the form of a demonstrable
threat to society, or exposes a major public controversy, or introduces a number of dimensions which challenge normal operating
assumptions (the implied consensus discussed above), there is usually
some crisis resonse which forces non-routine perspectives into the
policy making arena. Environmental issues often demand such a
response because they are associated with many non-routine attributes. The introduction of multiple goals reflecting differing ideologies; the difficulty of obtaining all the relevant information, given
limitations in time, budgets, manpower and technical capability; the
problem of identifying and incorporating external effects within the
decision making apparatus; and the question of limiting the three
26. This is probably a more important problem than is generally realized. Decision environments create forces which narrow problem definition along preselected notions, but
because the decision environments for different groups of participants differ, so will
problem identification vary.
27. This ability is known as integrative complexity and is discussed briefly by White,
supra note 27, at 123 and more extensively by M. Barker, The Structure and Content of
Environmental Cognitions (1972).
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branches of government-the legislative, the executive and the
judicial-to harmonize the necessary inter-relationships between four
levels of decision-making-the legislative, executive, regulatory and
adjudicatory-demand a non-routine response in policy making and if
all four are combined the strains on the existing policy making
apparatus are considerable.
Figure 2 summarizes four kinds of decision flows that function
within the process of policy making. It may be argued that many
decisions take place in response to political stress, activated by a
variety of interest groups and mobilized public opinion. While this
may frequently be the case, decision flows may be set in motion, in
some instances, simply because certain key individuals feel that
appropriate action should be undertaken. Strategic military decisions
are of this type, as are actions taken to safeguard public health.
Where demonstrable pressure is brought to bear upon policy makers,
a chain of decisional events may be set in motion which leads to
non-decisions; deliberate suppression of political debate or merely
the symbolic use of power. Standards may be established but never
enforced, or a commission of inquiry established which never publicly reports in full.8 Another linkage leads to routine agency
decisions-such as the construction or extension of a sewage treat-
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28. The whole issue of the pseudo legitimacy of various current participatory
mechanisms is well described by Riedel. See Riedel, Citizen Participation: Myths and
Realities, 32 Pub. Admin. Rev. 211.
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ment plant, seeding of clouds to stimulate rain, or other similar
actions.
As noted above, if the issue is unprecedented, or very complicated,
or if a variety of public and/or special interest pressure groups
become involved, or if the proposed agency decision is likely to
produce adverse effects upon particular individuals or groups, then
non-routine decisions will be made. These invariably result in more
extensive investigation and usually require some form of participation by politicians. Depending upon the nature of the issue and the
impact and political weight of affected individuals and groups the
strategic decision may take the form of a crisis response where some
direct concessions are made to placate adversely affected interests.
However, where the issue is very wide ranging and particularly difficult to solve, a process of participatory negotiation will be invoked,
with a more deliberate effort made to incorporate public opinion.
Since policy making should be a learning process, in all cases there
should be some form of evaluation to monitor performance (identified in the Figure 2 as dashed lines).
RESEARCH AREAS OF INTEREST
Environmental issues, in particular, challenge the deficiencies in
the existing policy making process, but there are many advantages
inherent in the present system which should be borne in mind when
seeking reform. These include: the striving for consensus; the roles of
key actors in influencing opinion and transmitting information; and
the function of the bargaining process. Key areas which appear to
require further investigation in environmental policy making relate
to: information flows; the assessment of public preferences; and the
introduction of more formal participatory mechanisms.
Information Generation,Processingand Transmission
Policy making institutions are enormously dependent upon the
generation of information, the faithful transmission of that information amongst actors, and the use to which information is put in the
analysis of predicted outcomes of possible alternative courses of
action. Evidence presented earlier indicates that various decision
environments tend to select and distort information and that this is
particularly noticeable when issues are confusing, when data is
unavailable or indeterminate, and when policy making institutions
are uncertain of their responsibilities.
It will probably never be possible to identify and weigh the effects
of this distortion, but certainly an attempt to do so should be made,
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by carefully monitored case studies of a variety of issues. These
studies should seek to ascertain what information is being generated
by what actors and/or institutions, the fidelity with which it is
transmitted, and how it is being interpreted and used. Such an
analysis would be useful in appraising the capability of the political
system to manage information flows, and should provide a partial
clue to the values and orientations of key actors and the institutions
with which they are associated.
It is conceded that any direct monitoring of these orientations (for
example, by means of interviews), while of crucial importance, will
be virtually impossible to undertake because the accuracy of response by participants with vested interests will always be questionable. Probably a number of complementary research procedures will
have to be employed including, possibly, direct participation in the
process itself, though certainly a careful scrutiny of all published
information should provide a helpful initial perspective. A further
difficulty here is the assessment of orientations that inevitably shift
over time and as the decision environment changes. Again there is no
simple solution to this dilemma except a research design that explicitly bears this problem in mind.
The Assessment of Public Preferences
Environmental choices must be made in the context of public
preferences for certain outcomes. One problem here is the lack of an
adequate research mechanism for measuring such preferences. Preferences imply a relationship or an odering of priorities, where to prefer
one thing means giving up a little of something else; this is a hard
enough thing to do for personal matters, but becomes almost impossible when collective public choices must be made. The standard
interviewing instrument (the questionnaire) is largely unsatisfactory.
for this purpose as it assumes that opinions are well formed and that
the nature of the tradeoffs required is clearly understood.
In any case the individual does not learn and transmit experience
in isolation. The evidence is now convincing that face-to-face contact
is a most influential means of shaping opinion and ordering preferences. 2 9 If an individual is to judge whether a proposed course of
action is good or bad, it may be helpful to develop a research
strategy based upon problem solving groups which combine the
advantages of employing key actors on the one hand and the meshing
29. For a good summary of the literature relating to this point, see D. Bern, Beliefs,
Attitudes and Human Affairs (1970).
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of alternative perspectives on the other.3 0 The use of problem solving groups is well established in the concept of the expert task force,
and has been further developed by social psychologists as a mechanism among non-experts. 3 '
Appropriate InstitutionalArrangementsfor
FacilitatingPublic Choice
The problem of resolving legitimate but conflicting objectives
requires a closer look at the mechanisms for making social choice.
Recent attempts to incorporate explicitly a multiple objective
weighting mechanism into project evaluation 3 2 have done little more
than point out the imperfections of the present political process
which is not well suited for this purpose.
A major issue here is that of the level and scale of representation,
for political scientists appear to be divided on the merits of a general
purpose versus specialized representation, covering small or large
areas. One proposal advocated by Haefele3 I is for a regional form of
government where policy is prepared by a number of generalist legislators who understand the preference hierarchies of their electorate,
and who are responsible for ordering priorities and resolving conflicts. This model assumes a high degree of accurate political communication between the electorate and their elected representatives
and a heuristic form of preference formation and ordering through
legislative debate. On the other hand, Self 3 4 advocates a system of
smaller, specialized, functional councils operating within a broadly
elected body, and dealing with matters of technical complexity.
These more specialized councils would be based upon smaller con30. In a thoughtful paper on the subject Thayer concludes:
The fundamental unit of organizational activity and analysis, so it seems now,
will be a collegial, non-hierarchical face-to-face problem solving group large
enough to include the perspectives and expertise necessary to deal with the
problem at hand, but small enough to assure each participant that his or her
contribution is substantial, meaningful and indispensable to the process.
See F. Thayer, Participation and Liberal Democratic Government 4 (1972).

31. See W. Gordon, Synectics (1961) and G. Prince, The Practice of Creativity (1970).
But the advantages of this technique for ascertaining citizen response to various environmental choices, especially where conflicting but legitimate objectives are involved, is as yet
little researched. Possibly some careful experimentation will be necessary before meaningful
results are produced and certainly the matter of choosing appropriate members of such task
forces will be of great importance.
32. The first practical example of this was by Hill, A Goals Achievement Matrix, 34 Jour.
Amer. Institute of Planners 19, but the idea has subsequently been incorporated into the
work of the Federal Water Resources Commission and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
33. E. Haefele, Representative Government and Environmental Management (1974).
34. Self, Elected Representatives and Management in Local Government: Alternative
Analyses, 49 Pub. Admin. 269.
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stituencies so that communication between the citizen and his
elected representative would be facilitated. Self is in effect advocating a specialized decision making task force which would report to
regional councils whose job it would be to weigh outcomes and
formulate policy.
A variation of these proposals advocated here incorporates the
notion of citizen task forces, formed on an area wide, functional
basis and acting initially as specialist-advisory bodies to policy
makers. Individuals who are opinion influentials within the social
structure could be chosen to form the core of such groups, the
purpose of which would be to clarify policy proposals and act as a
useful communications link between the public and professional
advisors. Widespread citizen participation is neither feasible nor
functional, but middle level specialist citizens' "representatives"
could form the necessary mechanism whereby differing social values
are incorporated into policy making.
While the task forces might begin as primary order specialist
groups with particular expertise and interests, it is desirable that
these would overlap into higher order (secondary) multiple interest
task forces composed of representatives of the specialist task forces
and senior policy officials. The advantage of this mechanism is that it
would bring together disparate but common interests at a face-toface group problem solving level, and appear to be most suitable for
the participatory negotiation form of decision making outlined in
Figure 2.
Motivation to participate will be tremendously influenced by the
credibility of the task force members in the eyes of the agency
officials, the elected representatives, and the general public. Graham3 5 emphasizes that this kind of arrangement is of mutual advantage as citizen opposition becomes more effectively mobilized (partly
due to favorable changes in environmental law in North America)
and as policy makers realize that the only way to resolve ideological
and value-laden conflicts is to confront the various protagonists on a
face-to-face basis. Until now senior policy makers have been unwilling to share their decision making responsibilities, but the development of legally sanctioned citizen participation and the peculiarly
complex nature of many environmental issues may well stimulate an
interest in more innovative participatory institutional mechanisms.
Neither the primary task forces nor the integrated task forces
would be political decision making bodies, for political decisions
properly should remain with formally elected representatives.
35. J. Graham, Reflections on a PlanningFailure,Plan.
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Rather, these are problem analyzing groups explicitly incorporating
disparate and conflicting interests. Indeed there is evidence that
opinions are most likely to be changed in social settings when "outsiders" (individuals who are respected but who provide a different
perspective and who help to create tensions among existing value
systems) help to point up inconsistencies and to show the consequences of certain courses of action."
The task force notion could be fitted into both the Haefele and
Self models. But it is not a panacea, for if it is to function effectively, its members must be truly representative and accountable to
constituent groups; otherwise the existing inadequacies between
client groups and their leaders would merely be replicated. Also it is
important to dispel any temptation on the part of task force members to assume unauthorized political authority. One solution is to
devise a careful monitoring mechanism which ensures that task force
members regularly meet with their client groups; another possibility
is to devise a by-passing procedure whereby concerned citizens can
communicate directly with key policy makers. But ideally, if the task
forces were held in public esteem, if policy makers and their professional advisers really believed in their worth and participated with
them, then membership of these groups might be regarded as a privilege. The resulting struggle to join a group could be resolved through
balloting, or other forms of legitimizing support, and possibly members should be paid for their services-a procedure which should
encourage them to be more responsive.
A related issue here is the question of adequate compensation for
disaffected groups. As is well known, public choice involves external
effects that are rarely incorporated directly into the decision making
process and in which disaffected publics are improperly compensated. The problem here stems from inadequate information and
unequal political power and representation. When there is a real
public outcry in such circumstances, policy makers may respond to
the crisis situation simply by "buying off" or "bribing" the disaf37
fected groups, as outlined in Figure 2. Wolpert and his colleagues
have worked on this problem intensively and have developed models
36. The inverse point is made by Brown, supra note 2, at 92. "If most members of the
group share certain attitudes, these are reinforced by 'resonance' and are difficult to dislodge. A group that has been successful in the past is particularly inclined to reject unfamiliar suggestions from new members. Even in a 'brainstorming' session, when the group is
actively seeking new ideas, it is psychologically difficult for members to produce ideas that
deviate markedly from the general consensus. Fewer creative ideas emerge in a homogeneous
group, in spite of the ease of communication."

37. See Mumphrey, Seley, & Wolpert. A Decision Model for Locating Controversial
Facilities, 37 Jour. Amer. Institute of Planners 397.
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of decision making in which bribes, in the form of additional facilities, are offered to disaffected communities to make more equitable
(and palatable) the noxious effects of certain decisions. The intent of
Wolpert's decision making models is to ensure that appropriate compensation is made so that political mistrust and potentially costly
opposition (in both political and resource terms) is minimized. These
models are explicitly bargaining models where gainers and losers
trade concessions. However, it is conceivable that the whole matter
of compensation might be even more equitably resolved using the
overlapping task force structure discussed above.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Environmental issues pose testing questions which strain the
routine procedures of our existing policy making institutions. The
shift toward more complex and more centralized bureaucracies
responsible for "environmental" matters is an ill-considered response
since it further restricts the openness of information flows, alienates
the citizen from the decision making mechanism, and increases the
likelihood of political authority being delegated to the non-elected
executive. The arguments produced here hint that with a better
understanding of the factors that shape the decision environment
which frames the policy making process, more open decision making
arrangements should be sought. But solutions can never lie in structures and institutions: in the final analysis the participants themselves will determine the success of environmental policy making.
The test of the adequacy of these measures will lie only in their
performance.

